It’s Lifemark…But Not As Expected
Posted by robin in Financial Articles Thursday March 18, 2010 11:24 am
This is intriguing…
Keydata is a drama with a second act.
Perhaps it will be more captivating than the first.
Act I saw Keydata Investment Services (KIS), a UK-based creator of structured investment products, closed down by the FSA in June 2009.
Keydata investors were among those ripped off when their Luxembourg-based fund was mysteriously liquidated in the mayhem of the financial crisis.
This was no mean feat as the assets in question are not renowned for their liquidity. It’s not everyone who wants to buy a second-hand American life insurance policy and the few that do tend to take their time over the purchase.
As such, £280m went walkies, £100m odd belonging to British Keydata savers.
After some deliberation, the British investor’s safety net – the Financial Services Compensation Scheme – defused a brewing uproar, with outraged from the Daily Mail leading the charge, and agreed to foot the bill.
The finger of blame pointed to a fugitive British businessman, David Elias, holed up in the offshore tax haven of Labuan, Malaysia. Elias is since reported dead - timely, if controversial to the end. A single manservant bore witness to his demise reported the Guardian.
Subsequent reports suggest the missing loot may have found its way to Brazil and bagged 400,000 acres of Amazonian rainforest.
While Elias was the villain of the piece, Keydata’s image was shattered along the way. Botched ISA listings, product errors and marketing literature that was somewhat economical with the actualite all came to light as its business entrails were dragged into public view. It was a sorry end to a business, which a decade ago, once attracted FTSE 100 private equity company 3i Group plc. as a significant investor.
In due course, Keydata’s appointed administrators, PwC, sorted out the mess.
Or, so we thought…
The intermission was rudely brief.
Only six days after Act I ended, the curtain rose on Act II.
On 13 November, the FSCS announced a bail out. HMRC chimed in it would not chase unpaid tax and investors had not lost their ISA allowance.
On 19 November, 2009 the Luxembourg regulator, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), announced it was placing Lifemark in ‘provisional administration’ for an initial period of three months and appointed KPMG’s Eric Collard to find out what was going on.
So what is Lifemark?
Lifemark is the up and coming star of Act II…and for British savers, its regulator and compensation scheme a much bigger deal.
Act I - featured a £280m fund with £100m odd of British investors’ money.
Act II - features a fund of an estimated £350m, 95% of which is British investors’ money. It also has four times the number of investors, some 23,000.
As of the end of 2008, Lifemark had assets of €461m (£419m) – including €262m life policies plus €100m cash – but subsequently would have received the proceeds of two more tranches in the first half of 2009: Defined Income Plans 7 and 8, which closed on 30 January and 17 April respectively prior to the plug being pulled in June.
At this point it is worth noting the difference between the value of the fund today and what it should one day be worth. The £350m fund owns life insurance policies that should eventually stump up $1.35bn (around £900,000 currently) when the last American life finally pegs out. Therein, it is hoped, lies the investor’s final profit.
Publicity on the subject seems sporadic. Perhaps this is less newsworthy. In Act I the fund assets were stolen and the villain was identified and outed - an easy to understand story with beginning, middle and end.
Act II is less straightforward. The assets exist. It’s just now they evidently aren’t as safe as PwC once pronounced.
Getting into the fund business…
Keydata’s raft of structured product launches backed by life settlements were all invested in Luxembourg domiciled funds, a fact hard to detect in their early marketing literature.
Initially, for the first three Secure Income Bond launches SLS Capital SA, was entrusted with the money. Ultimately a bum choice as we know now.
By the time Secure Income Bond 4 was rolled out, KIS had established its own Luxembourg fund operation to do the job, hence the creation of Lifemark SA in January 2006.
Its purpose was as a special purpose vehicle to issue publicly-listed corporate bonds, which is what investors bought. These in turn would be invested in American life insurance policies. The shareholders are listed as Dutch foundations and KIS CEO Stewart Ford was both a director and understood to control the company.
Against the initial three tranches of money invested via SLS Capital. Lifemark was the recipient of 35 tranches. According to PwC:
Secure Income Bond 4
Secure Income Plans 1-12 and 14
Defined Income Plans 1-8
Income Plans 1-12 and 14
More tranches, more dough.
So it’s a bigger fund. So what? The assets are safe. PwC said so.
They did. But they were left scrambling for answers on 19 November 2009 following an announcement from the CSSF, the Luxembourg regulator. Lifemark was put into ‘provisional administration’. PwC administrator Dan Schwarzmann commented in a press release issued on 20 November 2009, the day after the news broke:
“…I am endeavouring to talk to Lifemark at the earliest opportunity so that I can provide investors with as much clarity as possible.”
Skipped Lifemark income payments also had Shwarzmann guessing 10 days later:
“Over the last few weeks, Lifemark has not been making the income payments due to investors. We have been repeatedly assured by Lifemark that this is due to administrative issues and have advised investors accordingly.”
Given PwC were also auditors to the Lifemark fund, it seems curious to the observer they have been so consistently behind the curve. Does Lux not speak with London?
Subsequently, in 2010, the CSSF suspended the listings of Lifemark securities from 1 February and extended KPMG’s involvement for a further six months, taking us to mid-August 2010.
By 2 March, 2010 the game was up. Lifemark declared default and announced it was working on a restructuring. The new deal is not an income plan but a zero income plan and with no secondary market in which to offload, investors will likely be bound to stay the course. Notices are coming through in batches according to when each issue hits its default date, but, in effect, all Keydata savers counting on income have been left high and dry.
The £350m question
What is the fund worth today?
The answer is of acute interest to legions of investors and will determine what they can expect to get back from this investment and when.
Rachel Irving, FSA enforcement officer, offered an insight when she warned of a problem brewing in a witness statement connected to a legal challenge from Ford over the regulator’s seizure of a computer server belonging to another of his businesses, Fieldglen Ltd. According to a Citywire report Irving noted:
A “predicted liquidity gap and Lifemark’s proposal for dealing with it indicate a real risk of problems at Lifemark.”
The article continued:
“Although Lifemark’s $1.3 billion of life settlement assets are ultimately thought to be sufficient to meet its obligations, the 23,000 investors with £350 million in Lifemark could face delays in payouts in 2012-13.”
The first bonds were due to pay out this spring, and as at the end of 2008, the fund was due to repay €461m to investors between 2011 and 2014.
A report in the Mail later in the month, February 27, was gloomier. They claimed they had learnt a “severe shortfall” is predicted in the fund. Their sources proved credible just three days after predicting investors’ income was expected to stop during the month, it did just that when Lifemark announced default.
In doing so Lifemark revealed it was necessary to “apply the remaining cash available to payments of insurance premium under the existing policies in the portfolio rather than using the cash available to make interest payments under the bonds”.
Marketed with a popular high yield income option, in the cold light of day, the investment logic to these life settlement-backed bonds looks somewhat perverse.
Typical vanilla income funds buy assets that yield some form of income such as dividends, coupons, rent and interest, from which to pay investors. This fund turned that notion on its head. It offered bumper income yields on fund assets that not only yield zippo by way of income they actually cede it ie you have to pay out to keep them viable. Anyone who’s ever bought a life insurance policy knows what happens if premiums go unpaid.
And the expense ratio is..?
Such a promise relies heavily on the sums being right, otherwise expenses drain fund liquidity and solvency issues arise. One estimate has it the fund was shelling out over £5m ($8m) a month in expenses – principally premium payments, policyholder income and commission to intermediaries (subsequently redirected to pay PwC).
Excuse the blizzard of numbers that follows but the point it gets to is a significant one.
Lifemark, reporting in euro, paid out €28m in interest expenses in 2008 and €21m in 2007.
In addition to premium payments, there are other costs. This fund was not short of them. Operating expenses in 2007 and 2008 weighed in at €27.5m and €22.8m respectively. 2008 cost is split between €15m “other operating expenses” and €12.5m “amortization prepaid expenses”, relating to the initial issuance cost of the bonds.
“Expenses had a massive detrimental impact on this fund” says one close to the action who adds a condemnation of the “outrageous” distribution agreements in place.
This then presumably includes the supporting cast, amongst them: investment manager Meditron Asset Management, premium payment administrators, Montage Investment Group, accountants Deloittes, as well as advisers to the fund, Luxembourg registered Tandem Partners SARL. The latter causing the FSA, not to mention investors, further dismay when it found out Stewart Ford had been paid £4.2m via Tandem between 2007 and 2009, and not the £904,500 it had thought.
Then reflect a moment on the currency complexities such a fund presents. Sterling investors buy into a euro denominated fund which invests into dollar assets. Eventual wind up reverses the process. In addition to these , currency deals were done in Canadian dollars, Swiss francs and Swedish krona.
As such, currency fluctuations pose a significant risk to promised investor returns, so you need a hedging operation to neutralise the impact. This is a further cost and, in itself can be risky. (A point made in the 2008 management report along with notice of other risks. This extensive notice did not appear in 2006/2007.) Lifemark included Societe Europeenne de Banque, a Luxembourg-based private bank, in the task.
As at the end of 2008, they had booked an “unrealised” forex loss of €79m on pretty chunky sterling and dollar contracts weighing in at £318.5m and $572m. The position is open ended and remains open. The loss is understood to have narrowed somewhat since though remains significantly in the red. It is weighted towards a recovery in sterling.
Another item of note was a mishap in 2006 when €7.7 million was reported lost in “transferable securities”.
This writer is no accountant but the accounting “equalisation provisions” are baffling to the layperson and, in the circumstances, raise further enquiry.
They are explained as losses in various forms (sales, default, lower market values or loss) which may cause a reduction in the value of the bonds. “Such short falls will be born by the bondholder in inverse order of the priority of payments,” it warns. This sounds like a cost but curiously appears as Income of €43m on the 2008 P&L.
It is glaring now is that investors have no idea what this fund costs. Operating costs at £25m (€27.5m) in 2008 on the projected final value at that time of $964m (approx £641m presently) suggests a fund with annual expenses approaching 4%. Pricey and when more legitimately set against the present £350m fund value…well, ruinous.
Add in your interest payments and soured forex and securities trades and we start to see where the Mail gets its “severe shortfall” from.
Would a UK investor know this? No. Expense ratios routinely available on vanilla collective funds – unit trusts, OEICs etc - go undisclosed when they come wrapped up in the mystique packaging of a ‘structured product’.
Taking Defined Income Plan 5 as our sample, the product brochure provides little detail under the ‘Charges’ section in the small print. The plans are designed to be held for the full term it says, early encashment will prompt a one-off £150 + VAT and crucially “all charges are reflected in the terms offered”. Ie they’re not telling. It also warns its charges may rise for any cost inducing regulatory changes. Er, transparency anyone?
The main problem
In a nutshell, they have got their sums wrong…
Keydata developed a model and it hasn’t worked out.
“Policyholders are not dying fast enough,” was the blunt assessment from FSA enforcement officer, Rachel Irving.
Keydata investors own a bunch of second-hand American life insurance policies. This is a relative novel, fashionable but not uncontroversial “asset class” which has been touted for its virtues in providing investment returns that are non-correlated to conventional financial market investments.
A life settlement fund collects a return on its investment when the Americans on whom they own insurance policies, die. It’s not for everyone: “ghoulish” snorted Private Eye in its recent censure.
The principle risk is the one that has materialised. Your lives assured don’t die fast enough. That costs the fund more premium money and has a detrimental knock-on effect for investor returns. Private Eye warns:
“Americans are living longer than actuarial tables say they should… Just as with toxic sub-prime derivatives, “death bonds” are reliant on computer models reliant on the past when the future may be a very different place. Some see ‘death bonds’ as the next securitisation time bomb.”
In the Lifemark fund at the end of 2008, there were 305 policies with a total life assurance value (ie benefit on death) of $963m and 10 people had died yielding $35m in life assurance proceeds. One close to the scene says the sums were done on the assumption of 30 deaths a year and have only been averaging around 10.
At the end of 2008, that was what was recorded, just 10 deaths, and the payout on one was lingering following a legal challenge from the spouse of the deceased. However, the average age in the portfolio is 82 and unconfirmed reports claim as of November 2009, the number of deaths had increased to 40. It may yet work out, given time.
Investment Manager – Walter Gerasimowicz of Meditron Asset Management – wrote in his 2008 year-end report:
“Investors should be pleased with the performance of the portfolio to date, as the Lifemark portfolio has achieved positive returns in each of the past 30 months.”
Exactly what is meant exactly by “positive returns” is hard to fathom in hindsight given the death rate was lagging badly and threatened future positive returns. It also makes an observer wonder at how management could make the claim of superior performance in the 2008 accounts:
“Lifemark’s approach has lead to the development of proprietary models and protocol which has allowed us to outperform other participants in the industry consistently…”
Particularly, given a paragraph later the management report goes on to inform that steps are being taken to arrange credit for possible liquidity issues as €461m owed to Keydata investors, falls due:
“Lifemark views the expected income from the life settlement portfolio as sufficient to meet all expected obligations. Expected drawdowns of a credit facility may be necessary in years 2011-2014 as a temporary solution while the Lifemark Portfolio seasons. We view those periods where cash is needed to temporarily fund liabilities, as manageable.”
As euphemisms go, “seasons” takes some beating.
Ragin’ regulator
The FSA appear hopping mad and reports indicate any relationship with Stewart Ford has broken down following accusations he tried to mislead investigators. They were left distinctly underwhelmed also by management proposals to plug liquidity shortfalls with new money from investors. Their fury is stoked by impotence and embarrassment - KPMG and HSBC first served warning in 2005 and KIS management have effectively run rings around their jurisdiction.
The FSA’s failure here was acknowledged in a recent speech from departing CEO, Hector Sants. He gave notice that, in future, the regulator will no longer behave like some bored fire officer playing pool in the station canteen while awaiting a call out for the next house blaze. It will instead actively promote fire prevention:
“We will now seek to proactively intervene earlier in the product chain to anticipate consumer detriment and choke it off before it occurs.”
A good thing too, as the KIS operation effectively sucked offshore more than half a billion quid from British savers. KIS administration and marketing operations were the only activities carried out in its jurisdiction. Everything else is out of the regulators reach.
Money went to Luxembourg, then on to America to buy life insurance policies. The controller of SLS Capital was based in Labuan, Malaysia. The KIS chief executive relocated to Switzerland. Lifemark itself is owned by Dutch foundations and KIS had another operation in the Isle of Man, domiciled in Caymans. One time sales director and polo enthusiast, Mark Owen is reported to be abroad.
The only thing in the FSA’s lap now is 23,000 aggrieved investors, not to mention their advisers, wanting answers. No wonder they’re stroppy.
Meanwhile, life goes on. Advisers are looking at £440 a head to pay for the Act I losses with possibly more to come. PwC are out of pocket millions in fees. In January 2010, Credit Suisse lent KIS UK £3.2m to maintain a pulse after the Lifemark commission tap was switched off. In February, the managing director of their Life Finance Group, that handles life settlement business, left for another firm.
Ex-employees of KIS UK, have regrouped at Arbuthnot Latham and since opened up shop in the structured product market as Gilliat Financial Solutions. The Keydata Income Property Bond is comprehensively bust and the Isle of Man operation, set up in April 2009, is now likely to wind up following reports the £6m fund bought a £3m of worthless SLS Capital units.
Note, if you have investments in Luxembourg, the compensation limit is a modest €20,000. In sterling, that’s around £18,200 at time of writing, against £50,000 in the UK.
As for investors in Keydata’s Lifemark-issued bonds they nervously await clarification from KPMG’s imminent re-structuring plan. Given a fair few are in their senior years themselves, it’s a touch ironic they may now effectively in a mortality race with the very individuals on whom their investment depends.
The last ones standing, win. Ghoulish indeed.
PS
The Lifemark 2008 annual report can be accessed here.
For a small fee, earlier years can be accessed here here.
Where’s the Key Data?
Posted by robin in Financial Articles Thursday July 9, 2009 5:33 pm
There appears something of an ironic ring to the name Keydata these days…
The investment administrator was brought down by the FSA on June 8 and deemed insolvent. Some sloppy listing work meant some of its bonds were rendered non-compliant for the promised tax-exempt ISA status. The exceptional tax charge it triggered landed on the company’s plate.
Three weeks later in its update of 30 June PwC, the appointed administrator, revealed it was much worse than that. £103m in assets entrusted to Luxembourg-based SLS Capital SA had “been liquidated and may have been misappropriated”.
The case is now a fraud inquiry. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has been called in to what is shaping up be the largest UK investment fraud in 20 years.
PwC also revealed income payments due from SLS had dried up back in October 2008. KIS papered over this considerable crack by maintaining payments itself. Now we know what PwC meant when it spoke of ‘irregular’ payments.
Director’s innocent?
In a joint statement the three now ex-directors defended their integrity. Citywire reported on July 1:
‘The directors only became aware this week-end that the underlying assets of SLS appear to have been liquidated. As such it would now appear that, along with other distributors, Keydata has been the innocent victim of a fraud perpetrated by SLS and those connected with it.’
The fact that KIS sanctioned the afore-mentioned ‘irregular’ income payments in lieu of SLS for eight months prior, prompts some Roger Moore-style eyebrow-raising as to their plea of ‘innocence’. The FT reported on July 3 that “people close to the investigation” maintain the fund’s assets had been “missing for at least six months”.
And it turns out the SIB bonds were not the first ‘irregular’ income payment sanctioned by KIS. They had been stumping up on series of property-linked bonds when their partner in this venture, Hometrak SA, let them down. This dates back more than 16 months to February 2008 and a question mark hangs over the fund assets. PwC is seeking “confirmation as regards the status of the underlying assets” totalling some £2m.
Taken together it would appear KIS’s directors had been frantically fire fighting for some time and the tangle with HMRC finally burned the house down.
The combined drain of income payments from KIS may help explain why an ostensibly successful and growing business reported a profits slump from almost £1m in 2007 to £1,400 in 2008. KIS’s auditors, BDO Stoy Hayward presumably are fielding questions on that one.
The directors also added in their defence that they did not have any connection with the late-David Elias, a controversial businessman and “recently deceased fugitive from UK justice” in the words of the FT. He had been holed up in Singapore, controlled operations through Malaysian-based BWT Holdings from the offshore tax haven of Labuan and is reported to have controlled SLS Capital.
High income promise lures the punters…
KIS launched its first venture into structured bonds backed by US traded life insurance policies with a series of four bonds called, again now with no small tinge of irony: Secure Income Bonds.
Here, the basics of the Secure Income Bond (SIB) series:
Name Offer Closed Maturity
Secure Income Bond issue 1 Closed 16 Sept 2005 7 Oct 2010
Secure Income Bond issue 2 Closed 4 November 2005 25 Nov 2010
Secure Income Bond issue 3 Closed 23 Dec 2005 20 Jan 2011
Secure Income Bond issue 4 Closed 24 Feb 2006 17 Mar 2011
The SIB 1-4 series offered an identical deal. In a nutshell:
· A 5-year fixed term
· Income or growth options:
Income: 7.5% pa or 1.875% pq
Growth: 43.5% as bullet payment at the end of the term
· Funds invested in a mix of traded life policies (life settlements) and cash
· ISA/SIPP investment options
In an age of low interest rates, the high income was/is attractive. But despite its reassuring product name, neither capital nor income was ‘secure’.
SIB 4 was different
At this point it appears the 5,500-odd investors in SIB 1-3 may have lost their money. Those in SIB 4 have not.
How so?
This is where a trawl through the sales brochures makes for informative reading. By the time SIB 4 there were a number of subtle but distinct changes.
Crucially, in the light of subsequent events, SIB 4 switched from SLS to Lifemark SA as its Luxembourg bond securitisation agents. This may have been purely a commercial decision but may also suggest that as far back as the start of 2006, KIS and/or its Luxembourg Custodians, MeesPierson Intertrust had had their fill of SLS. According to the FT, MeesPierson appointed directors on SLS resigned the following year.
All SLS assets from Keydata together with assorted others such as Brunei -based Orion Life, Isle of Man fund Interalia Optimised Returns Fund plc and clients of UK-based IFA Marks Jacobson, are feared missing.
In contrast, Lifemark SA assets are reported safe. Of the £349m KIS invested via Lifemark SA, PwC report they have “received confirmation of the existence of the underlying assets supporting these products”. SIB 4 investors, it seems, can breathe easy.
Economical with the actualité
The unlucky SIB 1-3 investors with the presence of mind to have retained their sales brochures might be scratching their heads in wonderment, not to mention anger.
1. Who is SLS Capital SA?
In brochures 1-3 HSBC, KPMG and MeesPierson are trumpeted under a section titled “Strong Management” (the title was amended to “Parties Involved” in the SIB 4 brochure) along with their credit ratings. For most readers the names will be the most readily digestible as we enter into this complicated world of trustees, custodians, advisers, traded life policies and financial models.
In SIB 1-3 their functions are explained as:
KIS – promoter/administrator/ISA manager
MeesPierson – custodian/registrar and payment administrator
HSBC – trades and holds the life assurance contracts for the custodian
KPMG – provided the actuarial model, manage portfolio cash flow, monitor credit ratings of the life assurance companies issuing the contracts.
SLS Capital SA does not feature. Not to mention other bit part players who have since come to light such as US firm CRT Capital Investment Banking Group, which we learn advised SLS Capital.
And yet SLS apparently had the critical responsibility of making “bonds-based securitised life assurance payments”. Somehow too it may have been in a position to unlock fund assets and “misappropriate” more than £103m from KIS clients alone.
The finger of blame now points at MeesPierson Intertrust, a major provider of corporate and trust services and part of Belgian-based bank and credit crunch casualty, Fortis. As Custodians they had responsibility for holding SIB fund assets – life policies and cash.
The FT reported on 4 July staff had moved on and directors of SLS, supplied by MeesPierson, “resigned in April 2007”. And PwC’s own Luxembourg arm which had been auditing the SLS books says it quit in 2006. BDO quit in May 2009.
Did this staff turnover make it possible for to liquidate 200-odd supposedly illiquid assets (ie US life assurance policies) into a relatively niche market and abscond with the proceeds?
And what of the role of HSBC? As trustees, they were responsible for the ownership and trading of the life policies. Were these life assurance policies sold behind their backs?
The SIB 3 brochure states: “Once bought, HSBC own the contracts as Trustees for the Bond”.
So if they owned and traded these bonds, and if the portfolio was liquidated, how did they let it happen? Where does their responsibility begin and end?
KPMG’s name is used liberally in brochures SIB 1-3. They are the financial alchemists who put together the actuarial model that made the whole fund work. They also have a role in keeping an eye on credit ratings of the companies issuing the life assurance policies in the fund.
By the time the SIB 4 brochure comes out in January 2006, KPMG’s name has disappeared entirely and we read only of an “actuarial model”. HSBC’s name has gone too and becomes an anonymous “leading Investment Bank” only MeesPierson remains a named party.
2. Er, actually it’s an offshore investment…
It takes a very careful read of the entire brochure for clues that this is an offshore investment.
More than that it’s offshore on two levels as the fund assets are:
(i) Predominantly US life assurance policies
(ii) Held in Luxembourg
KIS itself was a licensed UK entity regulated by the FSA but was it made crystal clear to the average investor this was an offshore investment from the information given? Not to this writer.
The traded life policy business is an exclusively US-centric on account of the unique characteristics applying in that market. In SIB 1-3 there appears no explicit statement as to the origin of the life assurance policies.
SIB 1 makes oblique mention in the small print Foreign Exchange Risk section: “Insurance contracts in the portfolio are purchased in US $ and the ongoing premiums are paid in US $ until maturity”.
SIB 2 and 3 exclude that statement but advise under their Issuing Company Risk section: “There are 3,500 contract issuers in the US and Canada that can be included in the portfolio.”
In SIB 4 this changes. An explicit admission finally emerges and a “portfolio of insurance contracts” becomes a “portfolio of US and Canadian insurance contracts”. In addition, the line that life assurance contracts would be bought from the likes of “AIG, GE Life and Prudential” has been removed too.
The names of US life assurance companies instantly recognisable by UK investors is likely a short one and the reference of Prudential a tad disingenuous. They may be in the same line of business but the reference presumably applies to the US Prudential Financial Inc., an entirely separate organisation from the UK’s Prudential plc.
As mentioned earlier brochures refer to corporate protection policies known as “Key Man” insurance as being the kind of policies this fund will specialise in. This information seems to do little more than add further unsubstantiated jargon more likely to confuse than enlighten lay investors.
Does the brochure tell you your money will be housed in Luxembourg?
Not for me it doesn’t. Instead, the overall impression is one where, in print at least, the offshore – indeed global – nature of this investment has been systematically suppressed. If so, this is at least understandable from a commercial, if not ethical, perspective. A fair swathe of cautious investors is wary of investing offshore. Such fears, where held, look well founded in this case.
All told the impression given, at best, is one of being “economical with the actualité”. At worst, though I’m no legal mind, the word misrepresentation comes to mind.
New “asset class” not at fault
This suspected fraud exposes the twisted entrails of such complicated investments and bring into sharper focus the FSA’s initial concerns.
It launched its inquiry into KIS on fears of the “aggressive marketing” of these bonds to frequently unsophisticated investors. A fair few of whom, bought these bonds directly and without advice. As such, they likely acted on the strengths of the promotional literature alone.
It also brings the old Buffett aphorism to mind: Don’t invest in what you don’t understand…and we could add, even if you are desperate for more income than measly 300-year low interest rates will pay.
As to the promoters of traded life policies as an investment and new “asset class”, it is another unwelcome blot in their copy book. In their defence, it’s worth remembering this is “suspected” fraud and not an indictment that traded life policies don’t work as an investment. To date there is ample to suggest they can and do.
And as to the abused investors in SIB 1-3, they may have to seek redress from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Even this safety net may prove inadequate for larger investors as it is capped at £48,000 – 100% on the first £30,000 and 90% on the next £20,000.
If any unfortunate SIB investors who chances on reading this, I would make one suggestion. If you haven’t already, dig out all your information on this and ask yourself: were you really given the key data needed to understand what you were buying?
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